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In recent years, there has been growing interest in understanding a person’s reaction
to ambiguous situations, and two similar constructs related to ambiguity, “ambiguity
aversion” and “ambiguity intolerance,” are defined in different disciplines. In the field
of economic decision-making research, “ambiguity aversion” represents a preference
for known risks relative to unknown risks. On the other hand, in clinical psychology,
“ambiguity intolerance” describes the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as
undesirable. However, it remains unclear whether these two notions derived from
different disciplines are identical or not. To clarify this issue, we combined an economic
task, psychological questionnaires, and voxel-based morphometry (VBM) of structural
brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in a sample of healthy volunteers. The
individual ambiguity aversion tendency parameter, as measured by our economic task,
was negatively correlated with agreeableness scores on the self-reported version of
the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. However, it was not correlated with scores
of discomfort with ambiguity, one of the subscales of the Need for Closure Scale.
Furthermore, the ambiguity aversion tendency parameter was negatively correlated
with gray matter (GM) volume of areas in the lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal
cortex, whereas ambiguity intolerance was not correlated with GM volume in any
region. Our results suggest that ambiguity aversion, described in decision theory, may
not necessarily be identical to ambiguity intolerance, referred to in clinical psychology.
Cautious applications of decision theory to clinical neuropsychiatry are recommended.
Keywords: ambiguity aversion, ambiguity intolerance, agreeableness, need for closure, prefrontal cortex,
voxel-based morphometry
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been growing interest in understanding
a person’s reaction to ambiguous situations and two similar con-
cepts related to ambiguity, “ambiguity aversion” and “ambiguity
intolerance.” These are described in different disciplines, eco-
nomics and psychology, respectively. However, it remains unclear
whether these two notions derived from different disciplines are
identical or not.
In the field of economic decision-making research, ambigu-
ity aversion represents a preference for known risks relative to
unknown risks (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber, 1992). In
economics, “ambiguity” refers to situations in which outcome
probabilities are unknown. On the other hand, situations in
which people know the precise probabilities of each outcome
are referred to as “risk” (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber,
1992). To illustrate an example of ambiguity aversion, suppose
there are two bowls filled with a mix of 24 blue and red chips
each. One bowl has 12 blue and 12 red chips (risky bowl). The
composition of the other bowl is unknown to the participants
(ambiguous bowl). Participants are asked to select one bowl and
told that if a chip with the color blue is drawn, they qualify for
a predefined payoff. Most participants would choose the risky
bowl, even if its payoff is lower than that of the ambiguous one.
Theoretically, the winning probability of both options is the same.
For the risky bowl, the probability of drawing the color blue
is 0.5. For the ambiguous bowl, the probability of drawing the
color blue is unknown, but the winning probability is also 0.5.
Nevertheless, previous studies have shown that most individuals
shy away from ambiguous options (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and
Weber, 1992; Levy et al., 2010). Furthermore, previous studies
also showed that some individuals have higher ambiguity aversion
than others. For example, less optimistic people were reported to
have higher ambiguity aversion compared with highly optimistic
people (Pulford, 2009).
On the other hand, ambiguity intolerance is a term from
the field of psychology. This construct describes the tendency to
perceive ambiguous situations as undesirable (Frenkel-Brunswik,
1949), and this is seen in various psychiatric disorders in clinical
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settings. For example, patients with major depressive disorder
often have a “black-or-white thinking,” which is a target of cogni-
tive behavioral therapy (Beck et al., 1979; Andersen and Schwartz,
1992). Furthermore, a previous study reported that the intoler-
ance of (discomfort with) ambiguity subscale of the Need for
Closure Scale (NFC) was positively correlated with all aspects of
delusion-proneness in non-clinical adults (McKay et al., 2006).
To date, a variety of questionnaires have been developed to
measure ambiguity intolerance in psychology. In the psychosocial
area of psychology, NFC was developed to estimate individuals’
desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward
ambiguity (referred to as the need for closure) (Kruglanski et al.,
1993). With its relatively high reliability and validity, NFC is
widely used in clinical psychology research (e.g., Mancini et al.,
2002;McKay et al., 2006). In the context of need for closure, ambi-
guity intolerance can be assessed by discomfort with ambiguity
subscale of NFC. In the subscale, there are items such as “I dislike
it when a person’s statement could mean many different things”
and “I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.”
In the field of psychology, ambiguity often means polysemous or
unreliable.
With the advancements of behavioral economics and neuroe-
conomics, some efforts using these approaches have beenmade to
assess behavioral and psychological problems observed in psychi-
atric disorders (Sharp et al., 2012). This kind of interdisciplinary
research is powerful and useful. However, similar jargon used in
the respective fields is not necessarily identical, and thus care-
ful application of the notions between fields is recommended.
It seems both promising and natural to apply economic tools to
the assessment of ambiguity intolerance in neuropsychiatric dis-
orders. However, studies investigating the relationship between
ambiguity aversion and ambiguity intolerance are limited. An ear-
lier study showed that the less tolerant a subject is of ambiguity,
the more he prefers to know the odds (Sherman, 1974). Yet, it
remains unclear whether these two notions are identical or not.
In recent years, neuroimaging studies have contributed to the
development of social neuroscience. While the neural mecha-
nisms that contribute to ambiguous decision-making remain a
topic of ongoing investigations, previous functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (MRI) studies showed the importance of several
brain regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ante-
rior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and parietal cortices involved
during ambiguous decision-making (Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel
et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006; Bach et al., 2009; Levy et al.,
2010). Concerning ambiguity intolerance, a recent functional
MRI study reported that intolerance of uncertainty was corre-
lated with insula activation during affective ambiguity (Simmons
et al., 2008). However, few studies have endeavored to investigate
whether the underlying brain structure is related to ambiguity
aversion or ambiguity intolerance in healthy adults. A number
of previous studies showed the importance of prefrontal cor-
tices such as the orbitofrontal cortex in decision-making using
voxel-based morphometry (VBM) (Ibarretxe-Bilbao et al., 2009;
Nakano et al., 2014). However, to the best of our knowledge, no
study has directly investigated the relationship between ambigu-
ity aversion and ambiguity intolerance using the VBM technique.
Elucidating the neural underpinnings associated with ambiguity
aversion and ambiguity intolerance should help us to better
understand the relationship of two notions.
In this study, we investigated the relationship between ambigu-
ity aversion and ambiguity intolerance combining an economic
task, the NFC questionnaire and VBM of structural MRI. We
also administered the self-report version of the Revised NEO
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) (Costa and McCrae, 1992),
which is one of the most widely-used questionnaires used for
assessing broad personality traits. Concerning an economic task,
we modified the choice under risk and ambiguity task used in
the previous study (Levy et al., 2010). We reasoned that if ambi-
guity aversion and ambiguity intolerance were identical, these
two notions would correlate similarly with fundamental person-
ality traits. A naïve prediction is that ambiguity aversion tendency
would be identical to ambiguity intolerance. However, in eco-
nomics, ambiguity aversion has been estimated by investigating
how individuals perceive the odds of the ambiguous options,
and thus it could be influenced by the participants’ optimism
(Pulford, 2009). On the other hand, ambiguity intolerance could
be perceived as the extent of discomfort associated with things
themselves that are gray instead of black or white. Therefore, we
expected that ambiguity aversion would be partially distinct from
ambiguity intolerance at behavioral and neural level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-one healthy volunteers were recruited from undergraduate
and graduate students. They did not meet the criteria for any psy-
chiatric disorders according to the Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID I). They also did not have a
history of head trauma, neurological illness, serious medical or
surgical illness, or substance abuse. Predicted IQ was estimated
with the Japanese Version of the National Adult Reading Test
short form (Matsuoka and Kim, 2007). Five participants were
excluded from the analyses because one did not choose logical
options in a considerable number of trials (i.e., he did not pre-
fer higher amounts relative to lower ones), suggesting that he did
not understand the task, and four other participants had behav-
iors not fitting with our behavioral model. Therefore, data from
26 participants (11 women, 24 right-handed, age: mean = 23.3
[S.D. = 6.4] range = 19–40) were analyzed in this study. The
estimated mean IQ was 106.3 (S.D.= 7.2).
This study was approved by the Committee on Medical Ethics
of Kyoto University and carried out in accordance with The
Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association. After complete
description of the study, written informed consent was obtained
from each participant.
ECONOMIC TASK
We modified the choice under risk and ambiguity task used in a
previous fMRI study (Levy et al., 2010). Participants were told to
play a lottery. They were shown two bowls containing 24 blue-
and red-colored chips and were told to choose one of the two
bowls. From the chosen bowl, one chip was drawn. In each trial,
participants were presented with a reference bowl on the left side,
which contained 12 blue and 12 red chips (same throughout the
trials). As for the other bowl, in half of the trials, the entire bowl
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. Participants were shown two bowls
containing 24 blue- and red-colored chips. In each trial, participants were
presented with a reference bowl containing 12 blue and 12 red chips on the
left side (same throughout the trial). In the risky trials (A), the composition
of the variable bowl was visible. In the ambiguous trials (B), part of the
variable bowl was hidden by a black occluder. The occluder was always
placed over the center of the image. Participants could claim the winning
payoff shown beside the color of the drawn chip.
was visible. Therefore, participants had information about the
ratio of red and blue chips in the bowl (risky trial, Figure 1A)
In the other half of the trials, part of the bowl was hidden by a
black occluder, which was always placed over the center of the
image (ambiguous trial, Figure 1B). Participants had the right to
win the payoff next to the color of the drawn chip. As shown in
Figure 1, when participants choose the bowl on the left side, if
a blue chip is drawn, they will win 2000 (about $20), whereas
they will win nothing if a red chip is drawn, and when they choose
the bowl on the right side, if a blue chip is drawn, they will win
5100, whereas they will win nothing if a red chip is drawn. It
was explained that their winnings were defined by the sum of the
outcomes of three particular trials out of all trials after they had
finished (after the task, we debriefed them on the purpose of the
experiment and paid the pre-defined participation fee).
There were 60 trials in this task (30 risky trials and 30 ambigu-
ous trials). As for the risky trials, six winning probabilities (1/8,
2/8, 3/8, 5/8, 6/8, 7/8) were used in the variable bowl. There were
three ambiguity levels (1/4, 1/2, 3/4) within the ambiguous trials.
Five winning amounts (1500,2000,3000,5000,10,000)
were used at each risk and ambiguity level [5 amounts× (6 risk+
3 ambiguity × 2) conditions = 60 trials]. However, the amounts
were varied slightly (±100) in each trial in order to prevent
participants from developing automatic responses. The winning
amount of the reference bowl was always 2000. There was no
time limit for choosing options in each trial. No feedback of the
outcome after each choice was provided. The interval between
successive trials was 2.5 s. The experiment was presented using E-
Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA,
USA). The order of the trials was randomized across participants.
In addition, the winning colors were mixed between participants.
MEASURES
Need for closure scale
The Need for Closure Scale (NFC) measures an individual’s ten-
dency to obtain firm answers and to avoid ambiguity (Kruglanski
et al., 1993). NFC is composed of 42 items and contains five
subscales (preference for order, preference for predictability, deci-
siveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness).
Participants are asked to indicate how much they agree with a
statement by responding using a 6-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate
greater need for closure. To estimate ambiguity intolerance in the
context of need for closure, we used the discomfort with ambigu-
ity subscale. This subscale consists of nine items, such as “I dislike
it when a person’s statement could mean many different things”
and “I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.”
Other subscales are described in Appendix 1 in Supplementary
Material.
Revised NEO personality inventory
To assess the Big Five personality factors, we administered the
Japanese version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI-R) (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Shimonaka et al., 1997).
This self-report questionnaire is composed of 240 items and
contains five dimensional scales (Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) corresponding
to a five-factor model of personality trait. In each item, partici-
pants are asked to mark from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree). NEO-PI-R results are presented as T scores with a mean of
50 and a S.D. of 10.
MRI ACQUISITION AND PRE-PROCESSING
All participants underwent MRI scans by 3-T whole-body scan-
ner equipped with an 8-channel phased-array head coil (Trio,
Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). The scanning parameters of the
T1-weighted three-dimensional magnetization-prepared rapid
gradient-echo (3D-MPRAGE) sequence were as follows: TR =
2000ms, TE = 4.38ms, TI = 990ms, FOV = 225× 240mm,
matrix = 240× 256, resolution = 0.9375× 0.9375× 1.0mm³,
and 208 total axial sections without intersection gaps.
MRI data were processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Center
for Neuroimaging, London, UK), and the VBM8 toolbox (http://
dbm.neuro.uni-jena.de/vbm/) running on Matlab (MathWorks,
Natick, MA, USA). In brief, all images were tissue classified and
spatially normalized to the same stereotaxic space by using the
diffeomorphic anatomical registration through exponentiated Lie
algebra (DARTEL) algorithm (Ashburner, 2007). The voxel val-
ues of segmented and normalized gray matter (GM) images were
modulated by the Jacobian determinants obtained from non-
linear normalization steps. We used the default parameters of the
VBM8 toolbox, but, as an exception, the ICBM space template
for East Asian brains was applied for affine regularization. Finally,
the resultant GM images were smoothed with Gaussian kernels
of 8mm full width at half maximum, on which all analysis were
performed.
DATA ANALYSES
Behavioral analysis
Individual ambiguity aversion tendencies were estimated accord-
ing to a previous study (Levy et al., 2010). First, the subjective
value (SV) of each option was modeled using a power function
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979):
SV =
[
p− β
(
A
2
)]
× Vα
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where A is the ambiguity level, p is the objective probability, V is
the winning amount, α is the individual risk aversion parameter,
and β is the ambiguity aversion parameter. Note that A is 0 for
the risky bowls (including the reference bowl), and p is 1/2 for the
ambiguous bowls.
Then, using maximum likelihood, we fitted the choice results
of each participant with the following formula:
Pv = 1
1+ eγ (SVF − SVv)
where Pv is the probability that the subject selected the vari-
able bowl, SVF and SVv are the SV of the fixed and variable
options, respectively, and γ is the slope of the logistic function, a
subject-specific parameter. For non-linear optimization, we used
the sequential quadratic programming method implemented in
SPSS 21 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA) with 27 starting positions. The
initial values (α: 0.3, 0.75, 1.2; β: 0, 0.5, 1; γ : 0.08, 1, 12) were
selected based on the results of a previous study (Levy et al., 2010).
Because the data of four participants failed to converge, they were
excluded.
An ambiguity-averse participant would show β > 0, and an
ambiguity-seeking participant would show β < 0. As for risk,
a risk-averse participant would show α < 1, and a risk-seeking
participant would show α > 1.
To investigate the relationship between individual ambigu-
ity aversion tendency and individual ambiguity intolerance ten-
dency, we performed a correlational analysis between individual
ambiguity aversion parameter and the scores of discomfort with
ambiguity. Correlation analyses were also performed between
individual ambiguity aversion parameter and each T score of
five domains of NEO-PI-R. Similarly, we also performed corre-
lational analyses between the scores of discomfort with ambiguity
and each T score of five domains of NEO-PI-R. Results were
considered statistically significant at p < 0.05. Because of the
exploratory nature of the analysis, multiple comparison correc-
tion was not performed on these correlational analyses.
Image analysis
To explore the brain region that was correlated with ambiguity
aversion parameter and ambiguity intolerance tendency through-
out the whole brain, we performed multiple regression analysis
separately using the general linear model framework in SPM8.
Age, gender and predicted IQ were entered into the model
as covariates of no interest. Because the images were modu-
lated for non-linear warping only, intracranial volume was not
included as nuisance covariate (http://dbm.neuro.uni-jena.de/
vbm/segmentation/modulation/). A statistical threshold of p <
0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 100 voxels was
applied. The choice of these thresholds was based on exploratory
data analyses and on effect size considerations derived from
previous VBM studies (Kubota et al., 2011; Sasamoto et al., 2011).
We interpreted the anatomical location of the clusters by
consulting the Anatomic Automatic Labeling toolbox (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002), the xjView toolbox (http://www.alivelearn.
net/xjview8/), and neuroanatomy atlas books (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988; Duvernoy, 1991).
RESULTS
Behavioral data from the 26 analyzed participants fitted well with
our behavioral model (R2: mean = 0.71 [S.D. = 0.12], range =
0.38–0.89). Participants varied widely in the degree of risk and
ambiguity aversions (α: mean = 0.45 [S.D. = 0.33], range =
0.02–1.27; β: mean = 0.61 [S.D. = 0.25], range = 0.22–1.10).
However, most subjects exhibited both risk and ambiguity aver-
sion. In our study, the reference bowl was always presented on the
left side. Nevertheless, participants did not follow a strategy of
choosing only one side. Mean response time in ambiguous trials
was slower than that in risky trials (risk: mean = 2.05 s [S.D. =
0.82]; ambiguity: mean= 2.57 s [S.D.= 1.07], p < 0.01).
The mean scores of discomfort with ambiguity were 34.6
[S.D. = 6.0], range = 21–44 (results of other subscales of NFC
are shown in Supplementary Table S1). The mean± S.D. [range]
of the T score of five domains of NEO-PI-R were as follows:
Neuroticism: 49.5 ± 11.1 [29–72]; Extraversion: 49.4 ± 11.5
[19–79]; Openness: 50.0 ± 9.2 [33–67]; Agreeableness: 52.5 ±
10.5 [31–71]; Conscientiousness: 53.1± 11.1 [34–72].
In the five domains of NEO-PI-R, a negative correlation was
found between the Agreeableness domain and ambiguity aversion
parameter (r = −0.56, p < 0.01) [the other four domains were
not significantly correlated with ambiguity aversion parameter
(all, p > 0.07)]. As for the scores of discomfort with ambiguity,
they were positively correlated with the Neuroticism domain (r =
0.44, p = 0.03) and negatively correlated with the Extraversion
domain (r = −0.48, p = 0.01) [the other three domains were not
significantly correlated with the scores of discomfort with ambi-
guity (all, p > 0.33)]. However, the scores of discomfort with
ambiguity were not correlated with individual ambiguity aversion
parameter (r = −0.13, p = 0.53) [there was also no significant
correlation between individual ambiguity aversion parameter and
any other subscales of NFC (all, p > 0.20)].
Next, we conducted a separate correlation analysis between
GM volume and individual ambiguity aversion parameter and
between GM volume and the scores of discomfort with ambiguity.
The individual ambiguity aversion parameter was negatively cor-
related with GM volume in the right middle frontal gyrus (MFG)
extending into the right posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG),
and the right postcentral gyrus (PCG) [No significant clusters
emerged with positive correlation with individual ambiguity aver-
sion parameters.] (Table 1, Figure 2.). On the other hand, scores
of discomfort with ambiguity were not correlated with the GM
volume in any region.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated the relationship between ambigu-
ity aversion and ambiguity intolerance at both the behavioral
and neural level. The individual ambiguity aversion tendency
parameter was negatively correlated with agreeableness scores on
NEO-PI-R, but it was not correlated with scores of discomfort
with ambiguity. Furthermore, ambiguity aversion tendency was
negatively correlated with GM volume in the right MFG extend-
ing into the right pIFG, and the right PCG, whereas scores of
discomfort with ambiguity were not correlated with GM volume
in any region. These results suggest that ambiguity aversion and
ambiguity intolerance are not necessarily identical.
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Table 1 | Brain regions negatively correlated with individual
ambiguity aversion parameters.
Brain region H Coordinates t Cluster
(mm) (voxel)
x y z
Middle frontal gyrus and
posterior inferior frontal gyrus
R 36 11 36 4.68 100
Postcentral gyrus R 54 −12 54 4.86 179
P < 0.001, uncorrected and k = 100.
MNI coordinates and t-values are provided for the local voxel maximum of the
respective cluster.
Abbreviations: Lt, left; Rt, right; H, hemisphere.
FIGURE 2 | Significant clusters negatively correlated with individual
ambiguity aversion parameter. Clusters negatively correlated with
individual ambiguity aversion parameter are shown. Height and extent
thresholds were set at p < 0.001, uncorrected and k = 100 voxels. The
clusters including the right middle frontal gyrus extending into right
posterior inferior gyrus, and the right postcentral gyrus were negatively
correlated with individual ambiguity aversion parameter.
In our economic task, participants varied widely in their
degrees of ambiguity aversion. However, most participants
showed ambiguity aversion, which is consistent with previous
studies (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber, 1992; Hsu et al.,
2005; Levy et al., 2010). Concerning the response time for each
probability condition, the response time in ambiguous trials was
slower than that in risky trials. This result is also in line with a
previous study (Bach et al., 2011).
In the correlation analysis, the ambiguity aversion parameter
did not correlate with scores of discomfort with ambiguity. In the
field of psychology, “ambiguity” means not only imprecision or
uncertainty but also the presence of multiple meanings (Werman,
1979). Indeed, the items of discomfort with ambiguity subscale
imply a distaste for polysemous situations, such as “I dislike it
when a person’s statement could mean many different things.”
On the other hand, ambiguity aversion is constrained to situa-
tions in which the probabilities of future outcomes are unknown.
Therefore, ambiguity intolerance might be much broader than
ambiguity aversion. Accordingly, people who are ambiguity intol-
erant may not necessarily be ambiguity averse if their intolerance
is not focused on an economically ambiguous situation. We did
not find significant associations between ambiguity aversion and
ambiguity intolerance, while a previous study reported that the
less ambiguity tolerant a subject is, the more he prefers to know
the odds (Sherman, 1974). This discrepancy might be due to
characteristics of the participants or the applied economic task
design. The previous study was limited to male undergraduate
students, but we recruited participants from both genders. As for
the task design, the earlier study performed a single trial for mea-
suring individual ambiguity aversion tendency, while our study
performed 60 trials for a more accurate evaluation.
In the five domains of NEO-PI-R, there was a negative corre-
lation between the Agreeableness domain and ambiguity aversion
parameter. A possible interpretation is as follows. Individuals with
high agreeableness scores are generally optimistic and believe that
most people are honest and trustworthy (Costa and McCrae,
1992). Like their optimistic view of human nature, they might
have an optimistic prediction of the probabilities of the ambigu-
ous bowl. This speculation is in line with the previous study
that showed highly optimistic people less frequently shy away
from ambiguous options (Pulford, 2009). On the other hand,
the scores of discomfort with ambiguity were positively corre-
lated with the Neuroticism domain and negatively correlated
with the Extraversion domain. The present result, that ambigu-
ity aversion was associated with a different personality domain
from those correlated with ambiguity intolerance, is in line with
the assumption that these two notions are not necessarily iden-
tical. Ambiguity intolerance describes the tendency to perceive
ambiguous situations as undesirable (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949),
which is seen in various psychiatric disorders such as major
depressive disorder. Therefore, it is reasonable that the scores
of discomfort with ambiguity were positively correlated with
the Neuroticism domain that includes anxiety, depression, and
vulnerability to stress. The negative correlation between the dis-
comfort with ambiguity and the Extraversion domain was also
consistent with the previous study, which showed that individu-
als who were sociable, talkative, and sought social activities were
more ambiguity tolerant (Caligiuri and Tarique, 2012).
Interestingly, the individual ambiguity aversion parameter was
negatively correlated with GM volume in the right MFG/pIFG
and right PCG. As for the right MFG/pIFG, these areas in
the prefrontal cortex play roles in higher cognition and behav-
ioral planning (Lee et al., 2007; Sakagami and Watanabe, 2007;
Barbey and Patterson, 2011), which are important for ambiguous
decision-making. Indeed, the lateral prefrontal cortex, including
the MFG and IFG, was frequently reported as being activated in
functional neuroimaging studies related to ambiguous decision-
making (Krain et al., 2006; Bach et al., 2009; Lopez-Paniagua
and Seger, 2013). Furthermore, a previous study reported that
the brain activation of areas (MNI coordinates; 39, 16, 33) near
the above-mentioned cluster in the right MFG/pIFG during a
task related to ambiguous decision-making was correlated with an
individual’s ambiguity preference parameter, and the authors pro-
posed that this region implements contextual analysis and inhibits
impulsive responses (Huettel et al., 2006). In line with this notion,
previous VBM studies showed that GM volume reduction in the
lateral prefrontal cortex was associated with impulsivity behavior
(Cho et al., 2013; Qiu et al., 2013). Taken together, our results
are in line with the previous neuroimaging studies, suggesting
that volumetric differences in the right lateral prefrontal cortex
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can also account for the inter-individual variability in ambiguity
aversion tendency.
We also found a negative correlation between ambiguity aver-
sion parameter and the cluster including the right PCG that plays
a key role in sensory processing (Keysers et al., 2010). Multiple
areas in the parietal cortex including the PCG were also reported
as being activated in the functional neuroimaging studies related
to ambiguous decision-making (Krain et al., 2006; Bach et al.,
2011), suggesting that the parietal cortex has roles in the pro-
cess of resolving ambiguity. Ambiguous decision-making is quite
complex because of a lack of information about outcome prob-
abilities, and sensory integration is considered to be involved in
ambiguous decision-making (Bach et al., 2009). Our results are in
line with this notion, supporting the theory that the parietal cor-
tex is crucial in ambiguous decision-making. Recently, the PCG
has been considered to not only encode bodily sensations but also
play a key role in social perception (Hooker et al., 2008; Keysers
et al., 2010). This area should be further explored in the future in
terms of its role in decision-making processes.
On the other hand, the neural basis of ambiguity intoler-
ance remains obscure, as we did not find any significant brain
regions that were correlated with the scores of discomfort with
ambiguity. This may be because the neural basis for ambigu-
ity intolerance depends on more general mechanisms underlying
a broad range of cognitive and social abilities, or because the
relationship between ambiguity intolerance and morphological
difference is too subtle to find in a sample of this study. However,
our null findings should be interpreted with extreme caution, as
the sample size of our study is small. In addition, the variation
of the scores of discomfort with ambiguity was small compared
to that of the ambiguity aversion parameter. This might cause
the difference in the VBM results of these two notions. Taken
together, it is clear that we need to be careful when interpreting
the relationship between two notions based on the present VBM
results.
There are several limitations to this study. First, the scale
of our study was modest for understanding individual differ-
ences. Second, we did not perform the economic task using real
money. Third, we treated ambiguity intolerance in the context
of need for closure using the discomfort with ambiguity sub-
scale of NFC, although there are a number of questionnaires
that measure ambiguity intolerance (e.g., Eysenck, 1954; Budner,
1962). Although discomfort with ambiguity subscale of NFC was
reported to correlate with the Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale by
Eysenck (1954; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994), caution should
be exercised in generalizing the present results. Further research
will be needed to replicate the present results utilizing multiple
instruments addressing ambiguity intolerance in a larger num-
ber of subjects. Fourth, a correction for multiple comparisons
was not applied during the correlation analyses with NEO-PI-R.
Fifth, we measured ambiguity attitudes with our economic task
that included only the domain of gains. Previous studies showed
that individuals reacted to a particular choice in a different man-
ner whether it was presented as a gain or as a loss (referred to
as “framing effect”) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; De Martino
et al., 2006). In the future, we should examine a person’s deci-
sions under conditions of ambiguity both in the domain of gains
and in the domain of losses. Finally, in the brain structures, the
focus of this study was restricted to the GM volumes. Of course,
white matter (WM) connectivity also has key roles in the neural
basis of decision-making. Future research utilizing multimodal
MRI will need to investigate the interplay between GM and WM
on ambiguous decision-making for better understanding of the
neural underpinnings associated with ambiguity aversion and
ambiguity intolerance.
In conclusion, we compared ambiguity aversion described in
decision theory with ambiguity intolerance referred to in clinical
psychology at both a behavioral and a neural level. Our findings
suggest that ambiguity aversion and ambiguity intolerance are
not necessarily identical. Although an interdisciplinary approach
to applying decision theory to clinical neuropsychiatry should
be expected to be both promising and ultimately useful, careful
application is recommended.
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